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Revised in concen
PRACTICAL POLITICS.

No. II.

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FOREIGN POLICY.

BY

MOUNTSTUART E. GRANT DUFF, Esq., M.P.

London :
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1880.



PRACTICAL POLITICS.

(ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERAL FEDERATION.)

No. II.

FOREIGN POLICY.

NOTE.

THE object of this Series, prepared for the National Liberal Federation, is to afford information on subjects of political importance, with the design of stimulating inquiry and aiding in the formation of sound and instructed public opinion.

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86, NEW STREET, BIRMINGHAM,
January, 1880.

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- I. THE RELATIONS OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, BY JAMES HOWARD.
- II. FOREIGN POLICY, BY MOUNTSTUART E. GRANT DUFF, M.P.
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FOREIGN POLICY.

INTRODUCTION.

“THE Gods have appointed it so ; no Pitt nor body of Pitts, or mortal creatures, can appoint it otherwise. Democracy, sure enough, is here : the tramp of its million feet is on all streets and thoroughfares, the sound of its bewildered thousandfold voice is heard in all meetings and speakings, in all thinkings and modes and activities of men.”

These words of Mr. Carlyle's, published about a generation ago, were recognised as true by many at that time, and will now find few gainsayers. There are still, as all may see, powerful monarchical and powerful aristocratic influences in our society, which may continue to work for long ages, but to a very great extent the United Kingdom has become a crowned democracy.

To some political philosophers this forms a subject of rejoicing, to others of regret. The politician, as such, neither regrets it nor rejoices at it. His business is to use the facts and forces

The United Kingdom has become, to a very great extent, a crowned Democracy.

Attitude of politicians in relation to this fact.

around him, as best he can, to promote the happiness, first of the community of which he finds himself a member, and secondly of the world.

Two
charges
made
against de-
mocracies.

There are persons who say that a democracy crowned, or not crowned, however successful it may be in the management of internal affairs, is incapable of governing distant dependencies or of carrying on international relations without disaster.

Only one
of them
relevant to
the present
subject.

To discuss the first of these allegations lies beside my present purpose, but to the second I will endeavour to reply.

How the
relevant
charge is
to be met.

It is certainly true that if international affairs are to be successfully managed by a democracy, care must be taken to adapt new means to old ends; the methods which were perfectly appropriate to a pure monarchy or a crowned oligarchy will not be *necessarily* the methods which are most appropriate to the altered circumstances.

The defects which are supposed to incapacitate a democracy for the management of international affairs are its fickleness, its ignorance, its liability to be carried away by gusts of passion. Now the whole of these defects have frequently been found, and found together, in the management of international affairs by a pure despotism; and if the first and last have been less often observed under an oligarchic government, the second has assuredly not been wanting. We must meet the accusation brought against democracy with a frank admission of its truth in the past.

Democracies, putting aside the case of the United States, the circumstances of which are too unlike ours to make the example of much consequence in the present connection, *have* usually been fickle in the management of international affairs, *have* been ignorant, and *have* been liable to be carried away by gusts of passion.

The remedy lies not in ignoring the fact, but in guarding against a manifest danger. The
remedy
threefold.

In order to do this successfully, three things are requisite.

1. The democracy must be led by chiefs in whom it confides.
2. These chiefs must act upon a thoroughly well considered system of policy.
3. They must not only be fully informed themselves, but must have the art of making the people see that they are so and of taking it with them.

Consideration of these three Requisites.

The first of these propositions will not be disputed, but some will say that the chiefs, in whom one portion of the public confides, will be necessarily distrusted by another. I. The democracy must be led by chiefs in whom it confides.

This is far from true in relation to international affairs. There ought to be no division of parties with reference to them, and as a matter of fact there have, for a long time back, till quite recently, been no such divisions in this country.

Lord Aberdeen was perfectly right when in

December, 1852, he said in the House of Lords "The truth is, that, though there may have been differences in the execution according to the different hands entrusted with the direction of affairs, the principles of the foreign policy of the country have for the last thirty years been the same."

There are divisions about international affairs now, not at all because the Liberals distrust the Conservatives *quâ* Conservatives, but because they, and not they alone, have come to the conclusion that those at present in power have no clear ideas and very little knowledge as to international affairs. The great majority alike of Liberals and Conservatives belong in international affairs to the same party, and that is the party of Great Britain and Ireland; but most Liberals and the best Conservatives have felt for the last two years in the position of men who find themselves passengers in a vessel, the crew of which is obviously unacquainted with the simplest duties of seamanship, which has touched ground once or twice already, and may at any moment be run on a rock-bound coast.

We need not then linger over the first of the three requisites which I have indicated. A man, who is fitted by natural disposition and by acquirement to be at the head of the Foreign Office, will if he understands how to make his policy intelligible to his countrymen, be, except on the rarest occasions,

supported by both sides, whatever be his political sympathies in our internal disputes, for the broad outlines of British foreign policy are commanded by circumstances, and there is no dispute about them amongst reasonable men.

That brings me to my second requisite, that the chiefs of our crowned democracy, whether Liberal or Conservative, must act upon a thoroughly well considered system of policy.

II. These chiefs must act on a thoroughly well considered system of policy.

What then should that system of policy be ?

What should that system of policy be ?

It should be a policy which abhors aggression, which tries to promote peace everywhere, which, while always letting it be clearly seen that we possess sufficient force to make it highly imprudent for any one to assail us, behaves in the society of nations as men of the world behave in ordinary society, with as little inclination to take as to give offence—a policy which recognises the truth that nations become great, not by squandering their resources in Quixotic enterprises, but by husbanding them; and that true glory depends, not upon military success, which is at best splendid misfortune, but upon brilliant achievements in the arts of peace, upon wealth wisely and nobly used for public and private purposes; upon long lists of great statesmen, great poets, great historians, great artists, great orators, great men of science; upon thinking first the thoughts which other nations adopt, and building up first the institutions which other nations imitate; upon deserving to obtain from the future the praise

of having been wise and just. That and that alone entitles any people to claim for itself the first place amongst the nations.

Mr. Gladstone's six principles.

It would be difficult to set forth the principles upon which British foreign policy should be based more clearly than Mr. Gladstone did in his speech at West Calder in November last. He said, as reported in the *Times*:—

1. That we should *foster* the strength of the Empire by just legislation and by economy at home, thereby producing two great elements of national power, viz., wealth which is the physical element, and union and contentment which are moral elements, and that we should *reserve* the strength of the Empire for great and worthy occasions.

2. That we should do our utmost to preserve the peace of the world.

3. That we should use every endeavour to maintain the concert of Europe, remembering that common action for a common object is the only way in which we can unite the Great Powers in obtaining objects connected with the common good of all.

4. That we should avoid needless and entangling engagements.

5. That we should acknowledge the equal rights of all nations.

6. That we should have a sympathy with freedom, and a desire to give it a scope founded not

upon visionary ideas, but upon the long experience of many generations within the shores of this happy isle.

But it may be objected "*dolus versatur in generalibus*;" all this is too vague, let us enter a little more into detail. Examination of details.

What should be the national attitude with regard to our Empire as it exists? Our national attitude to the Empire as it exists.

To that I reply that we should defend every portion of our Empire from foreign attack with the whole strength of the Empire, and that we should maintain that Empire pretty much as it is now—a general rule which would not of course prevent us giving up from time to time any portion which we deliberately considered a "*damnosa hæreditas*,"—such as the Ionian islands certainly were, such as, there is every reason to suppose, Cyprus will ere long prove itself to be—or from acquiring additional territory, if really convenient, in a proper and honourable way, as has, for example, often been done in India.

What should be our national attitude with regard to our treaty engagements? Treaty engagements.

I reply, that we should construe our treaty engagements exactly as honourable men construe their private engagements, always fulfilling them to the utmost of our ability, but remembering, in public as in private, the sound maxim "*Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia*." But just because we should be very

careful to keep our treaty engagements, our tendency should be to enter into as few onerous engagements, and above all treaties of guarantee, as possible. There are occasions when to enter into a treaty of guarantee is the lesser of two evils, but such occasions are very rare.

Interven-
tion and
non-interven-
tion.

Are we then in matters which are not provided for by any actual treaty to be partisans of intervention or of non-intervention?

I reply, that we should be partisans of neither the one nor the other. We should lean to non-intervention, just as well-conditioned people in ordinary society make it a rule to intervene as little as possible in the disputes of their neighbours; but to assume an attitude of absolute non-intervention, to try to be to Europe what Corcyra tried to be to Greece, is to engage in a vain labour, unless we can tow these islands into the middle of the Atlantic and give up India. But there is surely some mean between what a great jurist has called the "bloody meddlesomeness" of the half-educated Chauvinist or Jingo and that absolute non-intervention to which our geographical position says "No."

"Peace at
any price"
—what
that phrase
means.

Attempts are often made by unscrupulous writers to attribute to the Liberal party an opinion in favour of "peace at any price." I need hardly say that there is not the slightest foundation for such an attribution. The phrase "peace at any price" is not indeed a very happy one, even when used in

relation to the very small section of politicians with whose name alone it is brought into connection by any one who cares to use correctly the ordinary terminology of politics. There is no such thing as an advocate of "peace at any price." The most pacific of politicians are in favour of meeting force by force if these islands, or any of the world-wide possessions of England, are attacked, and they are further in favour of standing by any treaty engagements to which the honour of this nation is decisively and unequivocally committed.

The advocates of "Peace at any price" would object however to extending the treaty obligations of this country, and would get out of all existing treaty obligations which bind us to go to war under any circumstances, as quickly as good faith would allow ; nor would they, I apprehend, under any circumstances whatever go to war for an idea, or for any national interest about which there could be the slightest difference of opinion.

The *peace almost at any price* party, which comprises the vast majority of sensible men both in the Conservative and Liberal camps, only in so far disagrees with the "peace at any price" politicians, that it would by no means bind itself not to go to war for an idea, nor to get, as soon as good faith would permit, out of all treaty engagements which oblige us to go to war. With the members of this great party these questions resolve themselves

Peace al-
most at any
price.

into questions of "relative duties." It would be easy to imagine a case which in no way touched the interests of this country, in which it would be distinctly right for us to make war. But then it would have to be a case in which it was clear that our intervention would produce far more good than harm, and in which it would be morally certain that the misery which results from war would not be misery in waste. Happily such cases are very uncommon in actual affairs. The case of the support given in 1826 to the Constitutional party in Portugal is not really in point, for we were bound by treaty to defend Portugal against Spanish or any other external aggression. If Pesth had been a town on the Atlantic seaboard a strong case might possibly have been made out for interference in 1848. The Hungarians had in the earlier stages of their struggle with Austria a perfectly good cause, and it would have been much to the advantage of Europe that they should have succeeded then, instead of nearly twenty years later. Hungary, however, was not a country in which we could have effected anything at all without turning Europe upside down, and in which it was more than doubtful, under the circumstances of the time, whether we could have effected anything if we *had* turned Europe upside down.

Wars for
an idea.

Every case in which we are asked to interfere for the general good of mankind, or in other words to fight for an idea, must be examined on its own

merits. We must take infinite care that we really understand what we are asked to fight about. We must be on our guard against the generous error, that because a power is weak and appears to be bullied by a stronger power, it is necessarily in the right; and whenever there is a doubt we must remember that our first duty is to our own people, and above all, to that large class which, although it is the most apt to ring the bells at the commencement of a war which appears to be generous in its objects, is always the first to be obliged to wring its hands, if the war becomes a serious or long-continued one.

We shall rarely go wrong if we remember that hardly any occasion can arise on which it can be wise for us to adopt in European affairs an isolated position. Our rôle should be that of a cementing force which holds together the great Continental Powers, all of whom have more or less conflicting interests. Except at one point, which is hardly a portion of the continent, namely, the rock of Gibraltar, we have absolutely no separate interest on the continent of Europe. Whatever is conceived by any school of British politicians to be our interest on the continent of Europe is either a chimera, or it is the common interest of nearly the whole of Europe. If in European affairs we find ourselves isolated, the chances are ten to one that we are mistaken in our aims, or in the way in which we try to carry them into effect. This may

We can
rarely be
right in
European
affairs if
we are
alone.

not always be so. It has certainly not been so always.

Yet sometimes, as just before February, 1848.

It was not so, for example, in the end of the year 1847, when it is but too possible that we were on the verge of being attacked by a coalition of France and the despotic powers leagued together to crush the one state which represented the principle of freedom in this part of the world. At that period, however, although we were isolated with respect to the governments, we had allies in the people from one end of Europe to the other, and if we had been attacked, we might have lit up a war of opinion from the Bay of Biscay to far beyond the Vistula.

But such a state of circumstances not likely to recur.

It is hardly possible to conceive such a state of circumstances again arising. The whole course of events since the outbreak of the Sicilian revolution in the winter of 1847-8 has been playing the game of England, if only England is wise, and does not throw herself, as her insane rulers nearly led her to do in the spring of 1878, across the path of necessary and inevitable progress. If ever again there comes a time when the state of things which existed in Europe before 1847, or during the reaction which followed the year of revolutions, is reproduced, then we may again find ourselves isolated; for it is to be hoped that the love of being free ourselves and of seeing others as free as circumstances will permit, has got so into our blood, that not even a long continuance of

Beaconsfieldian rule could make a majority of the British people sympathize with anything analogous to the Congress policy—the policy with which we broke even before the Reform Act of 1832.

But what is the likelihood of anything of the kind coming to pass?

The stream of tendency is the other way, and we have nothing to do but to let well alone; not to attempt to prevent chemical processes by mechanical means; not to try either to galvanize dead nations or to prevent new ones from rising into life.

If we remember that it is only under the most peculiar circumstances that we can act wisely in European affairs without being on the same side as an overwhelming majority of the Great Powers, it is seldom, indeed, that we shall have to interfere by force of arms. Our wars for an idea will be few and far between.

A fussy anxiety to be interfering in the concerns of other people is as undignified as it is foolish, and proceeds not seldom from a secret doubt of our own strength. When foreign newspapers, trading upon the weakness of a section of our countrymen, try by taunts to engage Great Britain to do the work which ought to be done by other members of the European State system who are more immediately concerned, it would show more confidence in the greatness of the Empire if we were to remember two passages in the speeches of a Minister who was

A desire to
interfere
abroad
often arises
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secret
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our own
strength.

certainly not prone to distrust the powers either of himself or of his country.

Two quotations
from Mr.
Canning.

"What," said Mr. Canning, "is it to become a maxim with this country that she is ever to be a belligerent? Is she never, under any possible state of circumstances, to remain neutral? If this proposition be good for anything, it must run to this extent—that our position, insulated as it is from all the rest of the world, moves us so far from the scene of Continental warfare, that we ought always to be belligerent—that we are bound to counteract the designs of Providence, to reject the advantages of nature, and to render futile and erroneous the description of the poet, who has said to our honour, that we were less prone to war and tumult, on account of our happy situation, than the neighbouring nations that lie conterminous with one another." And again at Plymouth, "Our present repose is no more a proof of inability to act, than the state of inertness and inactivity in which I have seen those mighty masses that float in the waters above your town is a proof that they are devoid of strength, and incapable of being fitted out for action. You well know, gentlemen, how soon one of those stupendous masses, now reposing on their shadows in perfect stillness—how soon, upon any call of patriotism, or of necessity, it would assume the likeness of an animated thing, instinct with life and motion—how soon it would ruffle, as it were, its swelling plumage—how quickly it would put forth all its

beauty and its bravery, collect its scattered elements of strength, and awaken its dormant thunder. Such as is one of these magnificent machines when springing from inaction into a display of its might—such is England herself, while, apparently passive and motionless, she silently concentrates the power to be put forth on an adequate occasion.”

What then should our attitude be as to wars for British interests? Wars for
menaced
interests.

In the case of wars which are recommended on the ground of their being in defence of our legitimate and undoubted interests, we must inquire most carefully, first, whether the menaced interests cannot be secured without a war; secondly, whether they are worth a war; and thirdly, we must remember that we have always in the midst of us large classes who have a personal interest in war, which they quite naturally confound with a national interest.

We all recollect the story of the man who said in the spring of 1878, “D——n it, is there to be no fighting? Why, I’ve two sons in the army!”

We ought also to be certain that we know at least the broad facts on which a judgment must be formed.

“What I most fear,” a person of position said to a friend of mine, when the Russians were advancing in Armenia, “is that they should reach Lake Van. If they once do that, they will descend the Amoor and attack India!”

This is hardly a caricature of the kind of considerations which rallied a great many supporters the views of the present Government, but all thin are not British interests which ill-informed partisa fancy to be so.

When the causes of error which I have notice and others, such as the love of excitement, natur to all men, have been weighed and allowed for, if is still found necessary to fight in defence of our undoubted and legitimate interests, by all mean let us do so.

Seldom indeed shall we have to fight for our interests if we take proper precautions.

But the occasions in which any Power will be mad enough to interfere with the undoubted and legitimate interests of this country will be few indeed, if we take reasonable and obvious precautions.

What should these be ?

Now, what should these precautions be ?

We should, I answer, have a supreme Navy, an adequate Army, a first-rate Diplomatic Corps, Foreign Office, and Consular Service.

A supreme Navy.

By a supreme Navy is meant a navy which (1) strong enough to meet and overcome any combination of fleets which it is reasonable to imagine could be brought against it ; (2) is sufficient to make landing on our shores perfectly out of the question ; (3) is able to clear the seas of the armed vessels of an enemy at the very commencement of a war, and to keep them clear.

As to the first of these points there will probably be no difference of opinion. The navy was in

be with any possible combination of the late Administration, and is, it may to do so now.

Success of the second can hardly be over-taken, however decisive, won over a ship had landed on our coast, could re-position of this country as the one place which is perfectly safe from invasion of British credit would be destroyed by a successful landing, even if the ship had landed was hopelessly beaten or two.

He observed that under the third head of damaging the commerce of an enemy it is omitted advisedly, for our commerce is so enormous that our navy will often, at the beginning of hostilities, find that it is to do in sweeping the enemy's armed ships from the seas and in sealing up his war harbours. It will frequently be evident that any attempt to stop an enemy's commerce or to blockade his ports will do to us as much or more than it will do to him.

A adequate Army is meant an army sufficiently ^{An adequate} to co-operate with the navy in rendering a ^{quate} ^{Army.} possible, to take its share in holding the coast in garrison and defend the various fortresses and towns which we have scattered about the coast. To take, when occasion arises, under our arms, along with our allies, a part in

operations on the European continent—regard being had to the fact that it is *mainly* for pecuniary and naval assistance that our allies have a right to look to a country situated like the United Kingdom.

The army should be relatively small, but every exertion should be used to make it superior to any equal number of troops that could be brought against it, and while the system of short service introduced by Lord Cardwell should be carried further, the question should be carefully investigated, whether it is quite impossible to work that system in a manner which is not too disastrous to the finances of India.

While endeavouring in every way to make the army efficient, the Liberal party and the sounder part of their opponents should never so far forget their traditions as to cease to be jealous of militarism, the most dangerous at this moment of all the diseases which afflict the European body politic. I say the sounder part of their opponents, for the real Conservatives, the conservatives who still exist in some rectories and country houses, have just as little sympathy for the bastard Imperialism of the Prime Minister and his immediate following, as had the French Legitimists for the system of Napoleon III. which it attempts to reproduce in miniature.

A first-rate
Diploma-
tic Corps,

By a first-rate Diplomatic Corps, Foreign Office, and Consular Service, is meant such an organization of our means of obtaining information with regard to foreign countries and of influencing their Govern-

ments, as was sketched some years ago before the Diplomatic Committee by our present ambassador at Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, who, true to the ancient spirit of his house, and speaking with all the authority which belongs to his knowledge and experience, said, "I am of opinion that diplomacy will become one of the most powerful engines for the promotion of peace and good relations. At the present moment we look to armies to establish peace and goodwill among Christians; but I am sure diplomacy will be a better engine when properly developed and organized. The more feelers you have all over the civilized world, the better informed you are, and the more influence you can exercise; and I think that through an organization of that kind you are more likely to establish peace and goodwill among Christians than you are through armies, Armstrong guns, breechloaders, Minié bullets, and so on."

And this brings me to the third requisite, that the chiefs of the democracy must be fully informed about international affairs themselves, must have the art of making the people see that they are so, and of taking it with them.

III. The chiefs of the democracy must be informed themselves, and must make the people see that they are informed.

It is under this head that there is most room for improvement in the method of conducting our affairs which has prevailed even under normal Administrations, for it is impossible to deny that neither party has taken enough pains to see that it has had at its disposal a sufficient number of men who have aptitude for and acquaintance with international affairs.

The second order of statesmen in some countries of the Continent are far better informed about what is going on in Europe than are many statesmen amongst us who in all other respects have the advantage of them.

This is not only true, but it is an open secret. Everybody knows it, and the fact that it is known weakens all Governments. That was not so important when the mass of the people took no great interest in international affairs, except during great crises; nor had any means, if they had a view on foreign policy, of making that view prevail. Now, however, when international affairs are discussed in every newspaper and at every public meeting, is it not high time that we should take care that the natural leaders of the people should have some right to say, "You know that these things want anxious study, and you know we have given them anxious study"?

Never again shall we have international affairs managed on a firm and consecutive system until successive Cabinets become sufficiently strong, in the number of persons accustomed to consider international affairs which they contain, to give a reasonable guarantee to the mass of the people that their rulers really know more about foreign policy than they do themselves.

Improvement in this respect can, we fear, only be brought about gradually by the conviction of its urgent necessity forcing itself upon the minds of

men who engage in public business. When it has done so, I cannot doubt that there will once again grow up a general agreement about the part we should take in Europe, and that we shall once more be able to quote the words of Lord Aberdeen, which I have cited above, as correctly describing the actual state of things.

The late Government acted in all respects in accordance with the traditions of English foreign policy since the final abandonment of the ideas of Castlereagh, but it made one very great mistake; it did not remember that in dealing with a democracy you must not only *be* right, but *seem* right.¹

A mistake
of the late
Govern-
ment.

If it had occurred to Mr. Gladstone to take the same pains to put his foreign policy before the country as he did to put before it the question of the Irish Church, that policy would undoubtedly have been enthusiastically supported; but the amount of mental vigour which was used in expounding the views of his Government upon internal affairs was so enormously greater than that used in expounding its views upon international affairs, that numbers of people here and abroad jumped to the conclusion that it neglected the latter.

Nothing could be better, as I have said, than the *résumé* of the principles on which English foreign

The
Periclean
dictum.

¹ The present Government takes as its motto in *all* affairs, *Videri non esse*. The late Government took as its motto in *foreign* affairs, *Esse non videri*. The right motto for *all* Governments in *all* affairs is *Esse et videri*.

policy should be conducted which was given by Mr. Gladstone at West Calder, but the phrase which he used immediately before, and in which he recalled the Periclean *dictum* about women, that the less they were heard of the better, was of course taken hold of by his critics. Doubtless the less foreign affairs are heard of the better, but that they should not be heard of is, as the Germans say, "a pious wish," and it is of the last importance that the Liberals should make the country feel, that though they are occupied chiefly with domestic matters, they know more about foreign affairs than their opponents; that during the last twenty years more correct forecasts as to what was likely to happen on the continent of Europe have been made by Liberal than by Conservative politicians; that it would be just as easy to prove that some of Lord Salisbury's critics have been habitually right as that Lord Salisbury, the only man now in the Conservative Cabinet whom decently informed Conservatives believe to know anything whatever about foreign affairs, has been habitually, hopelessly, and even ludicrously wrong.

The mistake of the late Government will hardly be repeated.

The error on the part of the late Cabinet, of appearing, though only appearing, to neglect international affairs, has led to such grave consequences that we may be pretty sure no English Government will ever fall into it again; and it may be hoped that the amending of this error will draw attention to the deeper and more persistent

evil to which I have directed attention above—the evil, namely, that few English politicians find it worth their while to make a specialty of the study of foreign questions.

As soon as the leaders of party see that it will be to their advantage that their countrymen should consider that they have a better acquaintance than their opponents with international affairs, a wholesome rivalry will be introduced, and both parties will begin to give an amount of attention to the organization of their means of acquiring information which they have never done before. The strengthening both in quantity and quality of the Foreign Office and of the Diplomatic Service, to which I alluded above, will be seen to be absolutely necessary, and I trust it may fall to the Liberal party to initiate a reform which is so much wanted.

The two parties in the State may, it is hoped, learn to vie with each other in acquaintance with foreign affairs and in perfecting our means of information.

That party, or at least an important section of it, has always taken up a rather critical and not too friendly attitude with reference to the services which are directed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This is intelligible enough, for there is unhappily no doubt that in the good old times appointments in these services were often scandalously jobbed. Useless posts were kept up and filled by useless or worse than useless people. Persons passed into the service and even rose high in it who were emphatically hard bargains, merely in virtue of their having powerful patrons. Now however all that is very much changed. The

diplomatic service is not over-manned, but under-manned. It would be difficult to propose any wiser economy than that which would add a good many thousands a year to the diplomatic estimates, provided at the same time further security were taken for the money being well spent.

New securities wanted.

One of these securities should undoubtedly be throwing access to the service open to merit irrespective of party. Whether a Liberal or Conservative Government is in power, the sons of Liberal or Conservative fathers should, if their attainments and merits justify it, be able to come forward for the diplomatic as well as for the military service, not as a matter of favour but as a matter of right.

A modified system of competitive examination.

The Foreign Secretary must in the last resort be the person to appoint his own agents; and if he has to choose between the son of a political friend and of a political enemy, both young men having been stamped with the same stamp by competent examiners, he will naturally choose the son of the friend. Such cases however would rarely arise if entrance to the service always involved taking a good place in a competitive examination of a very high order, such as has been frequently suggested.

Supreme power over his department still to be left to Secretary of State.

Competitive examination is, as we all know, liable to many drawbacks, but if the object of the examination is not to place men in order as first, second, third, and so on, but to select a class of men out of which the Secretary of State may choose, almost all its evils are avoided.

What is true of the Diplomatic Service is equally true of the Foreign Office. It greatly wants strengthening. Nowadays it is virtually entered by competition, but by a competition which, unlike that which has been suggested for the Diplomatic Service, begins at the wrong end, all candidates who have to compete requiring to be nominated, an arrangement which, to say nothing of its other bad consequences, does not give the Secretary of State the opportunity of having good men brought to his notice if their connections belong to the opposite party in the State.

Not until our public men take more seriously the duty of being students of foreign affairs before they can claim with any right to lead public opinion about them ; not until, by making the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic and Consular Services, as good as they can be made, we have provided Government with proper eyes and ears all over the world, are we authorized to say that our crowned democracy cannot manage international affairs. The truth is, it has never had a fair chance of doing so, it has never possessed proper organs for their management.

It has been sometimes imagined that the gradual democratizing of Europe would be fatal to diplomacy, the most exclusive and aristocratic of professions. No one will continue to hold that opinion who looks below the surface at the realities of things. A great deal of the glitter and frippery that were once associated with diplomacy and made it the laughing-

The
Foreign
Office.

Till the
suggested
changes
have been
made, our
crowned
democracy
will not
have a fair
chance of
managing
its inter-
national
affairs.

Great
future of
diplomacy.

stock of serious men, has already fallen off it, and something more has still to fall, but the real importance of diplomacy is only beginning. More and more the diplomatist will think of himself, not merely as the representative of his Sovereign, out of whose personal income the English diplomatist used till recent times to be paid, but as the representative of the whole nation, from the Sovereign downwards. More and more will he recognize himself to be the expression of what ought to be, and, in spite of occasional Jingo outbreaks, *is* with every decade becoming more and more the prevailing feeling of this country in its relations at least with civilized States, "Peace on earth, goodwill towards men." More and more will he recognize that his is indeed the highest of all the services, that the army and navy are merely the necessary and honoured instruments which the nation keeps in reserve, with which to meet unreason, if he who is the representative of reason shall unfortunately fail.

But the
Diplomatic
Service
must be
improved
to enable
it to fulfil
its destiny.

In order, however, that diplomacy should hold this position, we must take care to make the Diplomatic Service and all that is connected with it what it ought to be, and good though it is in many respects now, it is susceptible of very great improvements.

The objects that we should set before us by those improvements are fourfold :—

1. That in every spot of political importance in the world there should be a thoroughly competent

person, whose business it is to collect and to transmit to the British Foreign Office the most correct and early information about all matters of importance.

2. That the Foreign Office should be so organized as not only to store and arrange all this information for the use of the Foreign Secretary for the time being, but to make public as much of it as can with advantage be made public.

3. That in every place of political importance this country should be represented by a man to whom his countrymen can point as a thoroughly creditable representative of what is best in these islands, that every British embassy and mission should be a centre of the best kind of British influence, and that no trouble or expense should be spared to make all their members fit to take, and capable of taking from the first, a distinguished place, not only in Court society, to which our diplomatists sometimes too much confine themselves, but amongst the men of letters and politicians of the countries in which they reside.

4. That diplomatists should not be quite so much "up in a balloon" as they often are. They will pardon the expression to one who has the sincerest admiration for their craft; and indeed all the best of them will admit, that it is a real misfortune that they are not oftener enabled, without too great sacrifices, to come into contact with our home political life. They greatly need "*se retremper*" from time to time in its boisterous but

health-bestowing currents. Leave should be more freely given and on easier terms for this purpose to those in the regular line ; and there should be, if possible, more frequent exchanges from parliamentary to diplomatic, and from diplomatic to parliamentary activity. That a man should be at once a member of the House of Commons and a representative of his Sovereign abroad, as was the case, for example, with Philip Stanhope, was no doubt an anomaly, but it was an anomaly which had its advantages.¹

The evil which I would propose to meet is by no means one confined to our own diplomatists. Other free nations suffer just as much or more from it, but it would be worthy of the mother of free nations to devise a remedy.

Some increase of expenditure would be required, but not very much.

I do not deny, I have indeed already admitted, that in order to effect the necessary improvements some increased expenditure would be required, but it would not be very much ; and for every thousand a year judiciously added to the diplomatic estimates, we might safely withdraw five from the naval and military estimates as framed, not by Ministers who are thinking more of by-ends than of either economy or efficiency, but from the estimates of really honest Ministers, Ministers who do not mind harassing interests if they serve the public.

“ Si vis pacem para bellum.” enough, if it means “do not trust too much to

See Chesterfield's *Letters*.

reason in a world in which there is a great deal of unreason;” but “*Si vis pacem para pacem*” is a *Si vis pacem para pacem.* still better one, if it is understood to mean, “take care to have all your agencies for seeking peace and ensuing it in the foreground and in thoroughly good order, so as to give reason the best chance you can.”

Much of the good, however, that might result from the increased knowledge of statesmen about foreign affairs will be lost, if they do not take more pains to spread their own knowledge and ideas amongst their countrymen. If they do not do so, their hands may be forced at any moment, and they may be driven into courses which will be equally disagreeable to sane Liberals and sane Conservatives, by some sudden enthusiasm, which would never have taken hold on the popular mind if men in the front rank of politics had been wise in time, and had kept their countrymen a little more *au courant* of their thoughts. The Russophobic nonsense which is in a fair way to ruin India, would never have got the influence it has, if statesmen had not blinked the Central Asian question a dozen years ago.

THE ABSENCE OF THE THREE REQUISITES IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT BRIEFLY
ILLUSTRATED.

Having then laid down and explained what appear to me the requisites for the management of international affairs by a democracy, I will take the two great questions which have been before the public of late years, and point out by way of illustration one or two of the errors that have been committed from want of attention to these requisites.

The first
requisite
not ful-
filled.

The first requisite, that a democracy, if it is to manage international affairs successfully, must be under the guidance of leaders in whom it confides, has never been fulfilled since Lord Salisbury succeeded in tripping up Lord Derby and installing himself in the Foreign Office.

Lord
Derby's
olicy.

It is from that event that the distinctive foreign policy of the present Government dates, for the policy of Lord Derby was in the main the policy of which Lord Aberdeen spoke—the foreign policy which belongs to no party or to both. Up to the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, Lord Derby was supported by his Liberal predecessors in office. From that event to his resignation, the fault which most Liberals attributed to his action was, not that it departed from the old lines, but that it had not been equal to the “occasion sudden” which was

brought about by the Bulgarian massacres and the effect produced by them in this country.

While respecting the spirit we should have broken Letter of old traditional policy in the East. with the letter of the old tradition, that the maintenance of the Turkish power on the Bosphorus was an European necessity.

The spirit of that tradition was that Constanti- Spirit of traditional policy in the East. nople and the narrow seas between Europe and Asia must not fall into the hands of Russia or of any other Great Power. Its letter only required the Crescent to remain on St. Sophia. It was the moment for a great decision, a decision as great and more wise than that which Canning announced when he said, "I resolved that if France had Spain it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

Surely it was not beyond the resources of statesmanship to find some combination by which the legitimate aspirations of Russia might be satisfied, Greece, Italy, France and the Western Church might be left unalarmed, while England remained just as she was, with no necessity for undertaking new responsibilities in the present, and freed from the apprehensions about Constantinople which so often trouble the repose of her statesmen.

Surely it was not beyond the resources of statesmanship to find some combination by which all these good things could be accomplished, with great advantage to the populations of the Eastern

Peninsula—Bulgarians, Turks, Servians, Albanians, Greeks, and all the rest of them of every creed and every degree of civilization ?

I can only say as I said before, *Scribantur hæc in generatione alterâ* ; but at least no such decision was taken, and our Foreign Office entered with the unhappy Conference of Constantinople into the region of half measures and resolute irresolutions. "England wills strongly in the East," said a sagacious looker-on, "but she knows not what she wills."

Lord Salisbury's policy.

In the spring of 1878, however, the scene changed. A new Foreign Minister seized the helm, and with a courage and an intelligent appreciation of what ought to be done, which his previous career had led all careful observers to expect, put the ship about and ran straight for the nearest reef.

No evidence that it has received the support of the nation at large.

There is, however, no evidence that this wild helmsman, or the foreign policy which he represents, ever had the slightest support from the nation at large. His being helmsman is the result of a mere accident.

The last election.

Nothing was further from the thoughts of the nation when it returned the Parliament of 1874, than that that Parliament would be mainly occupied with foreign affairs. The history of what occurred was given to perfection by the man who said, "The parsons and the publicans have let in the sinners." Petty questions and little spites possessed the minds of the men who were the active agents of the change, but it was caused much more

y Liberal inaction in some places and electioneering
 lunders in others, than by those agents. The most
 superstitious incumbent, the most assiduous fre-
 quenter of the public-house, might well have thought
 twice about his vote, the most crotchet-mongering
 : apathetic Liberal might have raised his voice
 or united and vigorous action, if he could have
 foreseen that events of the greatest magnitude were
 preparing, and that the question before him was
 whether England was to be given up in dark and
 difficult times to the guidance of "audacity and
 magnacity untempered by sagacity."

No one however foresaw this, and the majority
 voted under the joint influence of beer and fear as
 intelligently as the man who did his best to ostracise
 Aristides simply because he was bored by hearing
 him called "the Just," while too many Liberals
 pressed their crotchets to the bitter end.

It well known too that the majority of votes
 cast at the last election were cast in favour of the
 Liberals. Their defeat was owing to numerous
 small defeats, the result in more than twenty cases
 of running too many candidates, and which, while
 showing clearly that a trifling majority was against
 them in a variety of electoral colleges, said little
 or nothing as to the opinion of the country.

Even if this had been otherwise, to accuse the
 democracy of having sanctioned the foreign policy
 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the appropriation
 of Cyprus, and the Afghan war, would have been
 No infer-
 ence as to
 the power
 of a demo-
 cracy to
 manage
 foreign

affairs can
be drawn
from it.

grossly unjust. It has never been consulted about any one of these things, which have been the result of the perverse folly of a very small number of persons. No argument whatever, either for or against the power of a democratic society to manage well its international relations, can be drawn from the proceedings of the present Parliament.

The second
requisite
not fulfilled.

Our second requisite was that the chiefs who had the confidence of the democracy should act on a thoroughly well-considered system of policy.

Lord
Derby's
policy not
that of
Lord Salisbury.

It will hardly be maintained by the most enthusiastic supporter of the present Government that this has been the case with our rulers during the recent foreign complications. No one would for a moment maintain that the policy of Lord Derby was that of Lord Salisbury. If it had been so, Lord Derby would still be in the Government, and the admission that the policies are different is sufficient to enable us to say that our second requisite has not been fulfilled—that the men who have directed our foreign affairs since the beginning of 1874 have not acted on a well-considered system, but at the best upon two quite opposite systems.

Lord Salisbury's
policy of
1876 not
his policy
of 1878.

Putting that however on one side, let us examine very briefly whether Lord Salisbury's own policy on the Eastern Question has been consistent with itself. And for this purpose, with a view to give every possible advantage to an opponent that the severest advocate of deciding all moot points against ourselves could require, let us forget the line

which he took at the time of the Constantinople Conference, and speak only of what he has done since the 1st of April, 1878.

The policy on which the present Foreign Secretary ^{Lord Salisbury's} purposed to act was solemnly explained to the world in a despatch whose periods recalled the ^{policy of 1878 not} good teaching of the *Saturday Review* upon its ^{consistent} promotion, in the years which immediately followed ^{with itself.} the Crimean war.

In that despatch Lord Salisbury, amidst the ^{The des-} applause of all those Continental politicians who, ^{patch of} loathing both England and Russia, ardently desired ^{April 1st,} that we should shed each other's blood and waste each other's resources, placed himself between the Czar and the advantages which he and his people thought they had a fair right to claim in return for the sacrifices and sufferings of a terrible and exhausting struggle.

That policy might have been right or wrong, ^{The} but at least it was intelligible. It might have ^{Salisbury-} been the commencement of a series of acts which ^{Schouvaloff} showed that the Foreign Secretary knew what he ^{agree-} was about, and was acting on a well-considered ^{ment.} system. The events of the next few weeks made it clear, that unless Lord Salisbury had composed his Circular for the express purpose of deceiving his partizans and the world, he was acting upon no well-considered system ; for if it was right to stand between Russia and her ends, it was clearly not right to make a secret agreement with her in

The des-
patch of
January
22nd, 1875.

There is no reason to suppose that when in January, 1875, Lord Salisbury first pressed upon Lord Northbrook the establishment of a British agent within the territories of the Ameer, he had any intention of re-commencing what had been called forty years before "the great game of Central Asia."

If he had, I should still have called him a rash and dangerous politician, but should not have been so much frightened as I am when I see the Foreign Office in charge of a man who has the haziest notions as to the direction in which his own acts are leading him.

The an-
swer to
Lord De
Mauley of
June 11th,
1877.

On June 11, 1877, in reply to Lord de Mauley, Lord Salisbury spoke as follows:—"The noble Lord appears to have left out of his calculation that there are deserts to be traversed, and that perhaps a fortnight or three weeks, but certainly not less than ten days, across these deserts, would be required for the journey between the nearest accessible points of the two territories. I can assure the noble Lord that any danger of a Russian inroad on the frontier of British India is not quite so far advanced as he seems to imagine. The nearest point on the Caspian at which supplies could be gathered by Russia is over a thousand miles from our Indian frontier. The consideration of the danger to which the noble Lord refers may possibly interest a future generation of statesmen, but that calamity is not of such imminence as to

render necessary the motion by which the noble Lord seeks to avert it. I will not dwell longer on the geographical circumstances, except to protest against the statement of the noble Lord that the Empire of British India knows no bounds. My Lords, the bounds of that Empire are very minutely marked out, especially on the north-western side. Whatever the Empire of Russia may be, there is no doubt whatever as to what the frontier of British India is. It is perfectly well known, I cannot help thinking, that in discussions of this kind a great deal of misapprehension arises from the popular use of maps on a small scale. As with such maps you are able to put a thumb on India and a finger on Russia, some persons at once think that the political situation is alarming, and that India must be looked to. If the noble Lord would use a larger map—say one on the scale of the Ordnance Map of England—he would find that the distance between Russia and British India is not to be measured by the finger and thumb, but by a rule. There are between them deserts and mountainous chains measured by thousands of miles, and these are serious obstacles to any advance by Russia, however well planned such an advance might be.”

Now is it humanly possible that the man who spoke these words knew that he was lending himself, and had been lending himself for more than two years, that is since January, 1875, to carrying

into effect the most extravagant views of the school of which Lord de Mauley had made himself the spokesman—knew that in less than eighteen months he would have to rely on the Russophobic mania, and on that alone, for honest political support ?

What
Lord Salis-
bury had
been doing
from Jan.
1875, to
June 11th,
1877.

Why, what had happened since the 21st January, 1875 ? The day after that Lord Salisbury had addressed his despatch to the Government of India, pressing Lord Northbrook to procure the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British agency at Herat. Lord Northbrook and his Council, thoroughly alarmed, had telegraphed to ask whether the orders were peremptory or whether a discretion would be allowed to the Government of India, pointing out at the same time that the despatch was based upon some quite erroneous assumptions as to the feelings of the Ameer. Lord Salisbury had replied, the Government of India had set forth their views as to the extreme danger of the course proposed, in their despatch of the 7th June, 1875. To that Lord Salisbury had sent as a rejoinder upon the 19th November, 1875, the despatch in which occurs the too famous passage which led straight to the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari : “ The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions. There would be many

advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to *create*."

To this ill-omened despatch Lord Northbrook and his Council had again replied. Lord Northbrook had resigned, and Lord Lytton had been appointed and instructed to do what Lord Northbrook had never been instructed to do, that is, to offer something to the Ameer in return for the sacrifice that was being demanded—every care being taken to ensure that we should give with one hand and take with the other, in the spirit of the remarkable paragraph which has just been quoted. In return for mere deceptive guarantees the largest demands had been made upon the Ameer in violation of treaties and of the pledges given by Lord Mayo. That these instructions were given we know, because they have been laid before Parliament; but they have been laid before Parliament only in extract, and we are left to fill up the outline of the unrevealed instructions from the ordinary sources of information and from the acts of the person instructed.

Armed with these instructions, Lord Lytton had gone to India, had selected Sir Lewis Pelly, of all men in the world—the one whose name was likely just at that moment to be most terrible to the Ameer—as a special envoy—had found an "opportunity and pretext" for sending a compli-

mentary and special mission to Cabul, such as Lord Salisbury had desired Lord Northbrook to find or make—had been shown by the Ameer that the pretext was seen through, and that the assigned objects of the mission were merely ostensible. Coaxing having failed, threats had been resorted to. The letter of the 8th July, 1876, had been written, and the Ameer warned that the responsibility of refusing to receive the envoy would rest entirely upon his Government. The Ameer had replied in September. Lord Lytton had intimated to the Ameer that we could break him as a reed, that he was an earthen pipkin between two iron pots, that if he did not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia did, and desired it at his expense. Large bodies of men had been collected at Rawul Pindee ; a bridge of boats—the same of which Lord Salisbury, astounding to relate, declared in June, 1877, that he had never heard—had been thrown over the Indus ; officers had been sent forward to inspect the ground at a point on the Afghan border ; the Peshawur Conference had taken place, and Sir Lewis Pelly had threatened the Ameer, that if he did not accept the offers made, we would “continue to strengthen the frontier of British India without further reference to him, in order to provide against probable contingencies.” Our native agent had been withdrawn from Cabul, and the Peshawur Conference had come to an end without anything satisfactory having been

arranged, while proceedings had been going on at Quetta which were quite enough to have forced on a war with Afghanistan, even if they had stood alone.

We were drifting into war when Lord Salisbury replied to Lord de Mauley, not in the sense in which Lord Clarendon used on a celebrated occasion that, as originally used, most accurate and picturesque expression, but in the sense in which it is ordinarily employed. We were drifting because neither Lord Beaconsfield nor Lord Salisbury, who have been the authors of the whole mischief, had taken the trouble seriously to reflect what they were about. The second had begun by wishing to have his own way about a dangerous crotchet, the establishment of a British agent at Herat; the first thought that a manifestation of "pluck" would have a good effect on the constituencies, and from one blunder to another they were being led on to the invasion of Afghanistan.

The far more notorious words which Lord Salisbury used in replying to the Duke of Argyll a few days later, may be defended by his friends, as they were in effect defended by Sir Stafford Northcote, on the ground that his policy, alas! required him to make statements inconsistent with accuracy; but the reply to Lord de Mauley is couched in language which is quite irreconcilable with the theory that he so far understood that policy as to know that in the years 1878-9, the only argument of any

We were drifting into war when Lord Salisbury made his reassuring speech of June 11th, 1877.

The statements made by Lord Salisbury four days afterwards not incompatible with the theory that he understood his own policy, but the reply to Lord De Mauley incompatible with it.

weight, even with his own party, in favour of his policy, would be the alleged necessity for improving our old frontier in case of a Russian invasion.

The speeches of Lord G. Hamilton, and Sir S. Northcote in August, 1877, incompatible with the theory that they understood what was being done.

A perusal of the debate of August 9th, 1877, on the subject of Quetta, and of August 14th, 1879, on the subject of the Treaty of Gandamak, will, I am convinced, leave on the mind of any conscientious man of either party who reads them through, an indelible impression that the Ministers who replied on both those occasions to the speeches of the Opposition, were absolutely blind to the consequences of what their colleagues were doing. They made statements which on that theory alone can be reconciled with what is permissible, and happily they were, unlike Lord Salisbury on June 15th, 1877, not necessarily acquainted with the exact state of facts about which they made startling statements.

On these, however, I will not dwell, for one illustration is quite enough to make clear what I mean, when I say, that the person mainly responsible for the recent disastrous policy on the north-western frontier had no consecutive well-thought-out system in his head when he took the initiatory steps of that policy. The natural result followed. "Everything may be left, in part, to the hazard of adventure, everything except the fate of nations."

The third requisite not fulfilled.

The third requisite, that the chiefs of the democracy must be fully informed themselves, must have the art of making the people see that they

are so, and of taking it with them, has not been fulfilled, and could not by any possibility have been fulfilled, by the present Government, "*Ex nihilo nihil fit.*" These gentlemen were not in possession of sufficient information, and had not taken the trouble necessary to enable them to manage properly our Foreign affairs, and they could not in the nature of things give to the people a confidence in their possessing what they manifestly did not and could not possess.

The office of Foreign Secretary is by no means, in the opinion of some, the place in the Cabinet which requires the greatest amount of ability. Far more brain power is required, it is said, to enable a man to contrive and carry through Parliament such a measure as the Disestablishment of the Irish Church than would suffice to conduct well and wisely our international affairs for a long time. That may or may not be so, but pre-eminent amongst things indispensable for the successful conduct of these affairs are knowledge of facts, knowledge of men, the critical faculty, caution, and common sense.

You could never make a good manager of foreign affairs out of a man in whose brain the craziest fancies were always running races; you could not for example have made a good foreign secretary out of the Emir Fakredeem.¹ "There is a combination," said that individual, "which would entirely change the whole face of the world, and bring back Empire to the East. . . . Nobody ever opened my mind

Qualities
essential
to a
Foreign
Secretary.

Defects
fatal to a
Foreign
Secretary
—the Emir
Fakredeem.

¹ For the history of this personage see *Tancred*.

like you ; you will magnetise the Queen as you have magnetised me. Go back to England and arrange this. You see, gloss it over as they may, one thing is clear—it is finished with England. Now, see a *coup d'état* that saves all. You must perform the Portuguese scheme on a great scale, quit a petty and exhausted position for a great and prolific Empire. Let the Queen transfer the seat of her Empire from London to Delhi. There she will find an immense Empire ready made, a first-rate army, and a large revenue. I will take care of Syria and Asia Minor. The only way to manage the Afghans is by Persia and the Arabs. We will acknowledge the Empress of India as our Sovereign, and secure for her the Levantine coast. If she like, she shall have Alexandria as she now has Malta—it could be managed. Your Queen is young ; she has an *avenir*. Aberdeen and Sir Peel will never give her this advice ; their habits are formed. They are too old, too *rusés*. But, you see ! the greatest Empire that ever existed ; besides which she gets rid of the embarrassment of her chambers ! And quite practicable, for the only difficult part, the conquest of India, which baffled Alexander, is all done.”

The Emir
Fakredeen
Prime
Minister.

But some one may say “ *Quid ad rem ?* ” What has the Emir Fakredeen got to do with our Foreign Office ? What has he got to do with it ? Why, for the last two years the Emir Fakredeen has been Prime Minister and Director-general of all our affairs at home and abroad. Do we not see in the passage I have just quoted, at once Lord Beacons-

field's astounding influence at Court? the disproportionate importance which India—in the hands of men, most of whom know nothing about India—has lately obtained? the Delhi pageant, the Imperial title, the design on Syria which was frustrated by Lord Derby's resignation? the protectorate of Asia Minor? the distrust and dislike of Parliament and of hum-drum statesmen like the late Sir Robert Peel? to say nothing of the war on the north-western frontier of India, and perhaps some further development of insanity which may be concealed under the phrase, "the only way to manage the Afghans is by Persia and the Arabs."

No; you certainly could not make a good Foreign Secretary out of the Emir Fakredeen; but I do not know that he would not have made quite as good a one as you could make out of a man like Lord Salisbury, with whom the fates seem to have a *vendetta*, and who has hardly ever espoused a cause during all his parliamentary life without the mocking voice of Destiny being immediately heard from behind the scenes of the political stage, crying, Lost! Lost! Lost!

Well, but Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, although the most powerful, are not the only members of the Cabinet. Good and well, we know the names of its other members, and all of us, who care to do so, can with great ease find out their antecedents and judge for ourselves how far they are likely to mend matters. No fair critic would deny to some of them very considerable merit.

The Emir Fakredeen as compared with Lord Salisbury.

The other members of the Cabinet in their relations to Foreign affairs.

Every one admits that Lord Cairns is a great English lawyer ; that Mr. Cross has managed, to the general satisfaction, the administrative as distinguished from the legislative duties of his office, and that he made one good speech about Foreign affairs ; we all know that Sir Stafford Northcote is a sufficiently good financier to shudder in secret at the statements which he makes in public—but all that has nothing to do with the matter in hand, and I maintain that no Conservative who knows what he is talking about and has the slightest self-respect can venture to say that these men, or any of them, have made a sufficient study of foreign affairs to be able to direct this country wisely and well in its international relations, for no one, I presume, will assert that the kind of knowledge necessary for that purpose comes by inspiration, or is transmitted on taking office through some magical power latent in the Sovereign, like that which was supposed to make the Royal touch effective for the cure of the King's Evil.

But even if
the present
Cabinet
had know-
ledge,
would its
members
have tried
to make
their
policy in-
telligible ?

But even if the members of the present Cabinet had possessed the requisite knowledge to frame a consecutive foreign policy, there is no evidence that they have at all realized the importance of enlightening the country as to what they were doing, or making their foreign policy intelligible. It has been throughout a policy of startling effects and surprises, arranged to dazzle the unthinking—not to convince the judgment of the thinking part of the community. I should like to know when in modern times a critic *so kindly* and so responsible as Lord Aberdare has

ever brought against his opponents, with the approval of all well-informed and honest men, such a charge as the following: "Certain Ministers have not treated Parliament and the country with openness, candour, and sincerity; because they have concealed many things they ought to have revealed and have used language studiously calculated to mislead the people of England."

Years ago the Prime Minister boasted of his consistency; and consistent he has been in one thing, in that view of his surroundings which was the key-note of his first work, "The world is mine oyster, which I with sword will open."

"*Populus vult decipi et decipiatur*" has been the motto of his Administration ever since Lord Derby left him, and will be its motto to the end.

The Prime Minister consistent in one thing.

"*Populus vult decipi et decipiatur.*"

HOW FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED:

The proper way to conduct foreign affairs is, it appears to us, diametrically opposite to that which we have recently witnessed. Details as distinguished from broad principles must of course be kept secret while negotiations are proceeding; there may be and should be infinite reserve and caution in the means adopted abroad; but there must be no surprises, the country must understand thoroughly whither it is being led and why it is being led, in a particular direction. There must be reticence, and a good deal of it, but the less reticence the better. The Foreign Secretary

must recognise that it is distinctly his business not only to conduct foreign affairs but to lead the opinion of his countrymen about them, and in this he must be aided by his colleagues. If this be true it follows for the proper management of foreign affairs that a great deal more speaking will be required of the Ministers of the future and of their supporters. The fusillade of oratory which we have had this autumn will be not an exceptional but a normal occurrence. It will no longer be possible for Ministers, of however secretive a turn, to reserve their explanations to the month of February. This increased openness of speech will lead to many inconveniences; but although the government of a free people by itself (when as in this country it has the inestimable advantage of having the highest prize of all withdrawn from the contention of party, thanks to our monarchical institutions, and when a very large number of offices are also withdrawn from being a subject of contention, thanks to competitive examination) is unquestionably the best in the world, no sensible man ever denied that it has its evils, and the atmosphere of constant discussion, in which we and our sons are destined to live, is one of these. Still it is an evil which has its good side. An atmosphere of constant discussion is necessarily an atmosphere of intellectual life, and many minds will be strengthened by political discussion to do good work in fields far removed from politics.

CONCLUSION—RESULTS RECAPITULATED.

I may recapitulate in conclusion the results to which I have wished to bring my readers.

1. That there is no reason to fear that this country, which is now so largely democratic, and which will, like all other European communities become in the next two or three generations more decisively democratic than it is now, should find itself at all hampered thereby in carrying on its international affairs.

2. That the methods which have hitherto been approved for the carrying on of our international affairs are not in all respects appropriate to our altered circumstances, but require some revision and improvement.

3. That the improvements chiefly wanted are these :—

(a) That our statesmen should try to become more and more international in the sense in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys called Mr. Cobden an international man.

(b) That they should not only know more than they do of foreign countries, foreign modes of thought, and foreigners generally, but be known by their countrymen, to have a real knowledge of these things.

(c) That they should act upon clear, well-understood principles, never laying themselves open to the charge, as the present Government has done, of involving the nation in new and tremendous liabilities, not only behind the back of Parliament

and without having given any opportunity for their schemes being discussed, but under circumstances which involved a complete abandonment of principles which have hitherto been considered sacred by both parties in the state.

(d) That the good-ordering of the Diplomatic Service should be recognised as a matter of supreme national importance—of as great importance as the good-ordering of the army or the navy; that no expense and no trouble should be spared for the attainment of this object; and that we should set before ourselves no lower ideal than that suggested by Lord Odo Russell when he said, in 1871, to the Diplomatic Committee, “Our Diplomatic Service ought to be as well organized for its purposes as the ‘Prussian army or the Society of Jesus’ are for theirs.”

(e) That our statesmen should remember that they have now to deal with a far more mobile constituency than that which existed before 1868, and that they should take much greater trouble than formerly to be thoroughly intelligible; that alike by their own speeches and by all other legitimate agencies they should keep their views upon our foreign relations clearly before the people, not trusting merely to being right, but remembering the words of a wise man: “*Reality and Appearance*. Things do not pass for what they are, but for what they seem. Few be those who look at the inside, and many be those who are contented with what is on the surface.”

CHRISTMAS, 1879.

